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Not all farmers  - sometimes only a minority - are constrained
in their farming operations by inadequate credit.  And part of
formal credit is diverted to consumption so the effect on output
of greater supplies of formal credit might not be as large as one
would expect if one assumed that it would all be used produc-
tively.
The Policy, Research, and Extemal Affairs Complex distributes PRE Working Papers  to disseminate the findings of work in progress and
to encouragc the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors,  reflect orly their viess,  and should be used and cited accordingly, The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































dPolicy,  Rearch,  and Exlornal  AffaIrs
Agricultural  Podlces
WPS  571
This  paper  - a  product  of  the  Agricultural  Policies  Division,  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development
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Many  government  programs  want  to provide  actually  be  used  for  consumption  and  invest-
more  credit  to the  farm  sector  to increase  agricul-  ment.  Indeed,  medium-  and  long-termn  formal
tural  productivity.  If the  marginal  effect  on  credit  is practically  nil  among  the  agricultural
productivity  is  small,  those  resources  might  be  households  in the  study  area.  Rolled-over  short-
put  to  better  use  elsewhere.  term  credit  is sometimes  used  for  small-scale
investments.  The  diversion  of  short-term  credit
Feder,  Lau,  Lin,  and  Luo  conducted  an  for  farmn investment  is about  40  percent  for  an
econometric  analysis  of  the  effect  of  credit  on  average  household  in the  study  area.  This
output  supply  which  recognizes  that  credit  implies  that  almost  a third  of  the  forrnal  credit  is
markcts  are  not  necessarily  at equilibrium  - so  used  for  consumption  (of  current  goods  or
that  credit  rationing  (with  unsatisfied  demand)  durables).
and  nonborrowing  (when  credit  could  be  avail-
able)  are both  possible.  Only  about  37 percent  of  What  conclusions  does  this  suggest  in
the  farners  in the  study  area  were  constrained  by  evaluating  the  probable  effect  of  expandin,
inadcquate  formal  credit.  Informal  credit  agricultural  credit?  First,  not  all  farmers,  and
sources  provided  funds  for  specific  non-agricul-  sometimes  only  a minority,  are  constrained  in
tural  activities  that  were  not  fungible.  their  farming  operations  by  inadequate  credit.
And  second,  greater  supplies  of  formal  credit
The  results  indicate  that  one  additional  yuan  will  be  diverted  in part  to  consumption,  so  the
of  liquidity  (credit)  yielded  0.235  yuan  of  likely  effect  on  output  will  be  smaller  than  what
additional  gross  value  of output.  These  results  one  might  expect  if all  funds  are  assumed  to be
suggest  that  for  the  area  of  China  covered  in the  used  productively.
study,  a good  part  of  the  short-term  credit  may
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Credit  is an  important  element in agricultural  productlon  systems.  It  allows producers  to
satisfy  the  cash  needs  Induced  by  the  production  cycle  which  characterizes  agriculture:
preparation,  planting,  cultivation  and  harvesting  of  the  crops  are  typically  done  over  a  period
of  several  months  in  which very  little  cash  revenue  is  earned,  while expenditures  on  materials,
purchased  inputs  and  consumption  need  to  be  made in cash.  Cash income is  received  a  short
time after  the  harvest.  In the  absence  of  credit  markets,  farmers  would  have  to  maintain cash
reserves  so  as  to  facilitate  production  and  consumption  in  the  next  cycle.  The availability  of
credit  allows  both  greater  consumptlon  and  greater  purchased  Input  use,  and  thus  increases
welfare  of  the  farmers.
If  a  producer  faces  an  infinite  supply  of  liquidity  at  a  given  price,  the  production
decisions  will  be  independent  from  consumption  decisions,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  household
models of  Singh et  al.  However, asymmetric  information  and  adverse  selection  typically  prevail
in  credit  markets,  giving  rise  to  credit  rationing  as  an  optimal  behavior  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss).
Furthermore,  government  intervention  in the  form of  interest  rate  ceilings  or  subsidized  interest
rates  is common in many countries'  agricultural  sertors,  necessitating  rationing.  When credit  is
rationed,  some  borrowers  cannot  obtain  the  amount  of  credit  they  desire  at  the  prevailing
interest  rate,  nor  can  they  secure  more credit  by  offering  to  pay  a  higher  interest  rate.  In
such  circumstances,  liquidity  can  become a  binding constraint  on  many farmers'  operations.
When liquidity  is a  binding constraint,  the  amounts  and combinations  of  inputs  used  by  a
farmer  deviate  from  their  notiornal optimal  levels  (the  levels  that  would  have  been  utilized  if
liquidity  were  not  a binding constraint).  - ie  marginal contribution  of  credit  is therefore  to  bring
input  levels  closer  to  the  optimal levels, thereby  increasing  output  and, since  the  quantity  of  land-2-
is fixed, yie!d.  This potential  gain in productivity  is one motivation underlying many  government
programs  seeking  to  provide  more credit  to  the  farm  sector.  An Important  issue  in  the  context
of  agricuiltural  credit  policy  is  the  magnitude of  the  expected  productivity  gain.  If  the  marginal
productivity  effect  of  credit  is  small,  then  the  resources  may  be  more  beneficially  deployed
elsewhere.  Assessment  of  the  expected  productivity  gain  Is  not  trivial  because  the  effect  of
credit  is  likely  to  differ  between  liquidity-constrained  and unconstrained  farm  households.
Some studies  attempt  to  identify  the  effect  of  credit  by  estimating  separate  production
functions  or  supply  functions  for  borrowers  and non-borrowers,  and then proceeding  to  compare
the  estimates  (see  review  in David and Meyer,  1980,  pp.  206-215).  One major  weakness  of  this
approach  is  the  implicit  assumption  that  all  borrowers  and  all  non-borrowers  are  respectively
homogenous  with respect  to  their  credit  demand/supply  situations.  This assumption  is often  not
valid, as  many non-borrowers  do  not  borrow  because  they  actually  have sufficient  liquldity  from
their  own  resources  and  not  because  they  cannot  obtain  credit,  while  some  cannot  borrow
because  they  are  not  credit-worthy.  Similarly, the  marginal effect  of  credit  may actually  be  zero
for  borrowers  for  whom liquidity  is  not  a  binding constraint.
The same criticism  applies  to  other  studies  in which all  sampled observations  are  pooled
to  estimate  production  functions  (or  output  supply  functions)  with credit  as  a production  input
or  as  a  supply  determinant.  As  will be  argued  in a  subsequent  section,  the  supply  function  is
alfferent  (both  in  parameters  and  in  variables)  depending  on  whether-  liquidity  is  a  binding
constraint.  Estimates  which do  not  take  account  of  these  restrictions  on  the  specification  are
therefore  flawed.
The  present  study  reports  an  econometric  analysis  of  the  effect  of  credit  on  output
supply  which avoids  some of  the  aforementioned  pitfalls.  The central  feature  is  the  recognition
that  credit  transactions  are  not  necessarily  in  equilibrium at  the  household  level.  That  is,  the
amount of  credit  desired  and tne  amrourt offered  are not  necessar,,y  equ4l so  th:t  creiit  SL.ppy- 3 -
rationing  (with unsatisfied demand) and non-borrowing  (while supply Is  potentially  avalIabl)  arre
both  possible.  The analysis utilizes  cross-sectional  household-level  data  from  a study  area  in
northeast  China, obtained  in  a  recent  farm  survey  designed  by  the  authors.  The pian  for  tloe
paper  is  as  follows:  Section  II provides  background  on  the  farm  sector  and  the  ru  al  cre sit
market  In China, and describes  the  specific  study  area  and data  utilized  in the  analys.s.  Section
liI discusses  the  formal model underlying  the  empirical analysis (the mathematical model ts pr e(ente  8
in  an  annex).  It  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  econometric  procedure  and  tr e  e  j>cal
results  In Section  IV.  The last  section  discusses  the  implications of  the  results.
II.  CHINA'S  FARM  SECTOR  AND RURAL  CREDIT  MARKET
China  introduced  a  smaliolder  agricultural  production  system  in  a  series  Of  reFcrms
between the  years  1979-1984.  The "household  responsibility  system" made individua! householes,
rather  than the  communes to  which they  belonged,  the  decision-makers  and mariagers of  the  C'N
farms.  Individual families  were  allocated  land by  the  communes on  leases  that  run  tycicairl  fc'
15 years.  The improved incentives  brought  about  a significant  increase  in agricuwtura! cut_tc  ac
in  rural  income (Lin).  While prior  to  the  reforrns  there  was only  Vimited nter3act  on  retbe 
households  and  financial  institutions,  the  emergence  of  smalilholder  ag:-!cu'tur  e  im;:  -s  t',t
households  now need liquidity  for  seasonal  production  and consumption,  or  longer-rer  . e
finance  investment,  construction  and ceremoniai  social  events.
Most of  agricultural  households'  transact,ons  w;th the  fcrma  f  ' sector  ?are 
the  rural  crecit  cooperatives  (RCCs).1  The interest  rates  for  agricuitura  oans  tas  ve  2-:  -
loans)  made by  forma!  credit  institutions  are  fixed  :by  the  government,  vith  some  _a-  a,
according  to  loan  categories.  In  1987,  the  rates  of  interest  for  agrcu!tural  Scans
between  7  and  1  4  percent.  The degree  of  intc, est  subsidy  is believed  to  Wave been  s'L
There  is  evidence  that  following  the  introduction  of  r-efcr-ms the  voiu;Tce  of  .
obtained  from  informal  sources  is  substantial  in  China.  Jiang  asserts  that  ron-;rsl  tutic'a,sources  contribute  roughly  half  of  the  credit  volume In rural  areas.  Feder  et  al. (1989)  report
non-institutlonaTcredit  shares  of  between one  third  and two  thirds  In several  study  areas.  The
most  common  sources  of  informal  credit  In China are  relatives  and  friends.  Most of  such  loans
carry  no  Interest  charges.  Possible  reasons  for  the  absence  of  a  substantial  profit-motivated
informal credit  market  In China are  discussed  In Feder  et  al. (1990a).  They include,  unclear  legal
status,  residual  ideological  resisLance  and  absence  of  collateral  assets.2
The present  study  relies  on data  collected  in December 1987  in Gongzhuling.  Gongzhuling
is  located  in  Jilin  province,  within  the  corn  belt  of  northeastern  China,  where  agro-climatic
conditions  dictate  essentially  one  corn  season  a  year.  The original  sample consists  of  2U0
households  selected  at  random from  eight  rdndomly selected  townships.  The information  gathered
covers  inputs,  outputs,  financial  assets,  credit  transactions,  and  household  characteristics.
Thirteen  households  are  deleted  after  determining  that  tneir  main activity  was not  agriculture  or
that  thei:  situation  was unusual  (e.g.,  a  widow maintaining a  home garden  plot).
The data  show that  nearly  three  quarters  of  the  sample borrowed  from  formal  sources
(essentially  the  RCCs) during  the  study  season.  The frequency  of  informal  credit  transactions
is  much lower  than  that  of  formal  transactions  (about  one  fifth  of  the  sample),  and  three
quarters  of  Lhese loans  were  provided  free  of  interest.  Given  the  significant  differential
between  the  rates  of  interest  on  the  two  types  of  loans,  this  may be  taken  as  evidence  that
.nformal  credit  is  not  a  good  substitute  for  formal  credit  due  to  limited  fungibility  (otherwise
every  borrower  would  exhaust  his  or  her  informal  credit  first  before  going  to  the  RCC).  The
share  of  formal  credit  in  the  total  volume of  new credit  is  66.5  percent.
Table 1 presents  the  distribution  of  loans by purpose  and by type  of  lender.  It  is readily
apparent  that  the  predominant stated  purpose  of  formal  loans (all of  whicn are  short-term)  is for
the  financing  of  current  production.  Most  of  the  informal  credit  is  reported  to  have  been
obtained  for  purposes  other  than  production,  with construction  and social  expenditures  appearing-5-
dominant.  Informal  loans  contracted  for  these  purposes,  however,  cannot  be  easily  diverted  to
finance  day-to-7ay  consumptlon  or  production,  because  the lenders,  mostly  relatives  and friends,
can  easily  monitor  compliance.  The bulk  of  the  fungible  credit,  defined  as  credit  which is  not
granted  for  easily  monitored  purposes,  In the  study  area  thus  comes from  the  formal  sector  (87
percent).
Given the  dominance of  formal credit,  a key  issue  for  tha  present  study  is the  extent  to
which its  supply  is  a  constraini  on  households'  desired  activities.  The survey  data  collected
permit  an  answer to  this  question.  Borrowing  households  were  asked  if  at  the  go ng  rates  of
interest  they  would  have  liked  more  institutional  credit  than  the  amount  they  were  actually
granted.  Households which did not  borrow  were asked  the  reason  for  not  borrowing.  The most
common reason  for  not  borrowing  was  availability  of  sufficient  own resources.  The borrowers
who indicated  a  desire  for  more  credit,  and the  non-borrowers  who responded  that  they  could
not  obtain  credit,  are classified  as credit-constrained.  As reported  in Table 2, about  37 percent
of  the  farm households  in Gongzhuling were constrained  by credit  accordina  to  this  classification.
The  liquidity  position  of  credit-constrained  households  as  compared  to  non-constra  ned
households  is  compatible  with  intuitive  expectations:  They have  significantly  lower  deposils  in
financial  institutions,  and overall,  their  liquid  resources  per  unit  of  land  are  12  percent  teIcA
those  of  unconstrained  households.
lll.  A MODEL  OF FARM  HOUSEHOLD  CONSUMPTION,  PRODUCTION  AND INVESTMENT
Suppose  the  household  considers  the  allocation  of  resources  at  its  disoosai  at  :"e
beginning  of  the  production  period  between  the  following  uses:  (i)  current  consumpt on,
investment;  (iii)  the  purchase  of  variable  inputs  for  current  production  (inclueing  lator  a'ncw
fertilizers).  Variable  inputs,  in combination with land and existing  capital,  will produce  this  perici  s
output.  Investment  will  not  mature  by  the  time  this  period's  output  is  produced,  but  Its
contribution  to  the  household's  welfare  may be  accounted  for  through  a valuation  function  wlichTABLE  1:  Distribution  of  Loan Purposes  by
Type of  Lender  (Percent)
P u  r  p o  s e
Sample  Prod-  Farm  Constr-  Consump-  Social  Other
Size  uction  Equip-  uction  tion  (Wedding
ment  Funeral,
etc.)
S.U.lr  ce  (Number
o f  L  oans  of  Loans)
rO' rp.Sl.  209  92.3  4.3  1.9  0  1.0  0.5
l  C mal  44  9.1  4.6  20.5  1 5.9  27.3  2  2.7
TABLE 2:  Extent  of  Formal Credit  Constraint
t  ite  Crs  SamDle  % Constrained
s.ze
(Nulber  of  Households)
.'.  s  ;frS  145  41.3
or'  - tCr  , D~n'es  42  28.3
187  37.4summarizes tne  contribution  of  capital  to  the  future  consumption  stream.  The household's  Initial
endowments  of-liquid  resources,  family  labcr,  capital,  and  lana  (the  latter  two  assumed  not
convertible  to  liquldity  during  the  perlod) can be  augmented by borrowing  at  the  beginning of  the
period.  Whether the  household  can  borrow  the  entire  desired  amou.  t  or  is  constrained  by  a
binding upper  limit on  the  availability  of  credit  Is of  considerable  consequence,  as  it  determines
whether  production  decisions  are  separable  from  the  consumption  decisions.  The household  is
assumed to  maximize  a utility  function  defined  over  consumption  per  family member in the  current
and next  period,  plus  the  utility  of  future  streams  of  consumption  summarized by  the  valuation
function  of  next  period's  capital,  per  family mcember. The optimization  can  be  carried  out  under
two  scenarios:  (I)  The supply  of  credit  is  greater  than  or  equ_l  to  the  demand (i.e.,  credit
constraint  not  binding); and (ii)  The supply  of  credit  is  less  than  the  notional  demand for  credit
(credit  constraint  binding).
The essence  of  the  results  of  such  a model 3  is that  under  case  (i)  above,  the  supply
of  output  Is not  affected  by  the  level  of  licuidity  (including  credit),  the  size  of  the  household'b
own family labor  force  or  the  total  size of  the  household.  The parameters  of  the  output  supply
function  in this  case  are  determined  by the  production  function  alone.  Under case  (ii),  however,
output  supply  is  positively  affected  by  increases  in  liquidity  (e.g.  increased  credit  supply)  and
in  the  household's  labor  endowment, while the  effec.  if  total  household  size  is  indeterminate.
1,,creases  in  the  initial  endowments of  land and  capital  would  have  a  positive  effect  on  output
supply  in both  cases  (i)  and (i),  while they  would have  an indeterminate  impact on  input  demands,
depending on  substitutability.  The parameters  of  the  output  supply  function  under  case  (ii)  are
determined  by  both  the  production  function  and the  utility  function.- 8  -
IV.  ECONOMETRIC  SPECFICATION  AND  EPRICAL  RESULTS
The econometric  model most  suitable  for  estimating  the  output  supply  tunction  with the
data  avallable  to  us  Is the  switching  regression  model with an  endooenous  criterion  function
described  in Maddala (pp.  223-228).  The model postulates  fo'r  any  observation  I
(1)  Y  P 1 XIl  + U11  iff  7  Z 1 +  UO  < °
(2)  Y21  P2 X 21  +  U 21 iff  7  Z 1 +  U, > O
where X1;,  X2;  and  Zi are  vectors  of  exogenous  or  predetermined  varlables,  Pl,  p2,  and  7  are
the corresponding vectors  of  parameters, and U 11, U 21 and U 1 are random  disturbances.  'ii  and
Y2i  are two possible values of  the dependent variable, only one of  which is actually observed
for  any given household, depending  on the  value of  the (unknown)  criterion  function  7 Z 1 + Ui.
The random disturbances are  assumed  to  have a trivariate  norma; distribution,  Identically and
independently  distributed across households. Applied  to  the particu!ar issue at hand, equations
(1)  and (2)  may be  viewed as  the  output  supply equations under a  non-binding and binding
iquidity constraint  respectively.  The criterion  for  whether liquidity is binding or not  is whether
the demand  for  credit exceeds credit  sapply, and the criterion function  7  Z + U, in our case, is
the  excess credit  demand  function  (i.e., demand  minus supply).  Excess credit  demand  is  not
directly  observable.  However,  from the survey responses, we know whether a given household
is constrained or  unconstrained by  !iquidity.  Using data  on  the  dichiotomous  responses, the
vector of  parameters  7 can be estimated  up to  a proportionality constant  by a probit procedure.
The estimated parameters are then used to  generate Mills ra.-.s  which are incorporated in tne
second stage estimates, where the equations (1) and (2), with their Mills ratio  corrections,  are
estimated by  a  linear regression.  Under model assumptions, the  estimated coefficients  are
consistent  and  asymptotically normal, and  with  appropriate  corrections  to  their  estimated
variance-covariance matrix (dua to  the  heteroscedasticity of  the stochastic  disturbance terms
in the second stage estimates) can be subjected to  statistical  tests  based on normality.- 9  -
The einpirical specificatlon  of  the  variables  which corstitute  the  vector  Z involves  both
determinants  orcredit  demand and  credit  supply.  Thus,  In  the  case  of  variables  which affect
both  demand and  supply  In the  same directlon,  one  cannot  predict  a  priori  the  expected  sign.
These  variables  are  (with  the  expected  effect  on  the  probabillty  of  being  credit  constrained
indicated  In parentheses  for  those  with  an  unambiguous  effect):  (1)  Land;  (2)  Capital;  (3)
Number of  adults  (-);  (4)  Number  of  dependents;4  (5) Education; (6) Farm experience;  (7) Savings
in  financial  Institutlons  (-);  (8)  Total  initial  liquid  assets  (-);  (9)  Outstanding  debt  to  financial
institutions  (+)!  (10)  Total outstanding  debt  (+); (11)  Last  sedson's  income (-);  (12)  Previous  loan
default  dumrry (+).  In ddditbon, eight  dummy  variables  for  townships were  introduced.  The r asults
of  the  probit  estimates  are  presented  in Table  :x.5  Two estirated  coefficients  are  statistically
significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level of  significance  and have  the  theoretically
predic ted  sign:  Savings  in  financial  institutions  and last  season's  income.  Eighty-two  percent
of  the -.-servations are properly classified as being credit constrained or unconstrained, implying
a fc.irly  good  fit.
The reduced form output  sunply equation for  liquidity-constrained households,  estimated
with the  double-log  specification,  involves the  folkviing  variables (with the  direction  of  trie
expected effect  noted in parentheses): t1)  Total liquidity 6  W;  (2)  Number  of  adults (+); (3)
Number  of  dependents (?); (4)  Land (+); (5)  Capital  (+); (6)  Education (+); (7)  Farm  experience
(+).  The specification  for  the households not constrained by  liquidiLy  is similar exceot for  the
first  three variables, which  do not  theoretically belong in the reduced form for  output  sup,z  Y.
The estimated coefficients  are reported  in Table 4.
In  the  output  supply equation  for  constrained households, (column 1)  the  estimated
coefficient  of  the total  liquidity variable is positive and statistically  significantly different  from
zero at the  5 percent  level of  significance, but  the number  of  adults and the number  of- 10  -
TABLE 3:  Estimated Coefficlents  of  Probit  Model
(probability  of  being  credit-constralned)







Number of  adults  .282
(1.950)




Farm experience  -.025
(1.666)
Savings in  financial  Institutions  -.121
(2.223)
Total  initial  liquid assets  .376
(1.552)
Outstanding  debt  to  financial  institutions  -.053
(.977)
Total  outstanding  debt  .057
(1.182)
Last  season's  income  -.974
(2.973)
Previous  loan  default  .587
(1.260)
Percent  correctly  predicted  .820
No. of  observaticns  156
a/  The equation  also  Included also  eight  township  dummy variables.  These are  not  reported.- 11  -
TABLE 4:  Estimated Coefficlents  of  Second Stage  Switching
Regression  Model for  Output  Supply
(Reduced Form)
(1)  (2)  (3)
Variable  a/  Regression  Credit  Credit  Credit
Constrained  Unconstralned  Unconstrained
Counter  factual
(N-48)  (N-108)  (N-108)
Total  liquidity  .183  - .042
(2.951)  b/  (1.261)
Number of  adults  .015  .001
(.641)  (.004)
Number of  dependents  -.020  - -.005
(.538)  (.247)
Land  .863  .875  .846
(8.166)  (18.120)  (15.202)
Capital  .027  .051  .052
(1.193)  (3.287)  (3.306)
Education  -. 004  .018  .018
(.261)  (2.216)  (2.206)
Farm experience  -.028  .063  .062
(.533)  (2.324)  (2.250)
R 2 .863  .867  .869
a/  Regressions  Included also  eight  dummy  variables  for  townships  and the  Mills ratios  computed
from  the  first  stage  probit.  These  are  not  reported.
b/  Numbers in  parentheses  denote  t-values- 12  -
dependents  do  not  have  statistically  significant  estimated  coefficlents.  The hypothesis  that  all
three  variablesdo  not  affect  the  supply  of  output  for  constrained  households  has a F-statistic
of  2.96  and  Is  rejected  at  the  5  percent  level  of  significance,  confirming  the  theoretical
predlctions  of  the  model.  The  quantity  of  land  Is  an  Important  and  statistically  significant
determinant  of  output  supply  for  constrained  and  unconstrained  households  (the  estimated
coefficients  of  the  output  supply  function  for  the  latter  group  are  reported  In column 2).  It
is  also  worth  noting  that  capital,  education  and  farm  experlence  have  statistically  significant
positive  effects  on  output  for  the  credit-unconstrained  households  but  have  statistically
Insignificant  effects  for  the  credit-constrained  households.  This  finding  suggests  that  capital,
education  and  experience  are  less  likely  to  contribute  to  output  If  the  farmer's  choices  are
constrained  by  iquidity.
While under  the  assumptions  of  our  model it  is  not  approprlate  to  estimate  the  output
supply  equation  for  the  unconstrained  households  with  the  inclusion  of  liquidity  and  household
composition  variables  (liquidity  is theoretically  endogenous  for  such  households  and the  estimated
coefficients  would be  subject  to  simultaneity  bias),  we experimented  with the  estimation  of  such
a  hypothetical  counter-factual  case  on  the  assumption  that  the  classification  was  wrong  and
therefore  these  households  were liquidity-constrained.  The results  (column 3 in Table 4)  indicate
that  none of  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  first  three  variables  are  statistically  significantly
different  from  zero  (the  hypothesis  that  all  three  are  not  significant  has  a F-statistic  of  0.55
and  cannot  be  rejected  at  any  level  of  significance)  implying that  the  counter-factual  case  is
not  borne  out  empirically.  Another  experiment  was the  estimation  of  the  model using  the  whole
sample without  separation,  that  Is,  as  If  all  households  were  liquidity-constrained.  The results
show that  the  estimated  coefficient  of  total  liquidity  in  the  output  supply  equatlon  would  have
been  about  two-thirds  of  that  in  column  1.  Predictions  based  on  the  wrong  estimated- 13  -
coefficients  would thus  lead  to  significantly  Inaccurate  assessments  of  the  effect  of  credit  on
output  supply.-
V. NPLICATIONS
Based on  the  estimated  coefficients,  if  every  credit-constrained  household  In the  sample
is  given  an  additional  credit  of  17.82  yuan  (equal  to  1 percent  of  the  average  level  of  liquidity
of  the  credit-constrained  households),  the  total  output  of  these  households  may be  projected
to  increase  by  201.08  yuan,  or  approximately  0.04  percent  of  the  total  output.  Thus,  on
average,  one  additional  yuan  of  liquidity  (credit)  would  yield  201.08/(17.82  x  48)  - 0.235  yuan
of  additlonal  gross  value  of  output.  These results  suggest  that  for  the  area  of  China covered
in  the  present  study,  a  significant  proportion  of  the  short  term  credit  provided  by  the  rural
credit  cooperatives  as  production  ci-edit"  may  actually  be  utilized  for  consumDtion  and
investment.  Indeed, medium and long  term  formal credit  is practically  nil amongst  the  agricultural
households  In our  study  areas,  and  a  similar picture  is  given  by  aggregate  statistics.  Rolled-
over  short  term  credit  is sometimes utilized  to  finance  small scale  investments.  A recent  study
by Feder et  al. (1990b)  finds  that  the  diversion  of  short-term  credit  for  farm  investment  is about
40  percent  for  an  average  household  in the  study  area.  This, in turn,  Implies that  almost a third
of  the  formal  credit  is utilized  for  consumption  (whether  of  current  goods  or  durables).
The results  of  the  study  highlight two  important  factors  which should  be  considered  when
evaluating  the  likely  impact of  agricultural  credit  expansion:  (i)  Not  all  farmers,  and sometimes
only  a minority,  are  constrained  in  their  farming operations  by  inadequate  credit;  (ii)  Expanded
supplies  of  formal  credit  will be  diverted  in part  to  consumption,  thus  the  likely  output  effect  will
be  smaller than  that  which is  expected  when all  funds  are  assumed to  be  used  productively.
These  ideas  have  been  propounded  by  the  Ohio  State  school  critics  of  credit  supply-led
development schemes.  The present  paper  thus  provides  empirical verification  of  these  views.- 14  -
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Footnotes
The  aut  ors  are  respectively  a  Principal  Economist  at  the  World  Bank,  Professor  of
Economics  at  Stanford  University,  Professor  of  Economics  at  Beijing  University,  and  Visiting
Scholar, Cambridge University.  We are  Indebted to  Angus Deaton for  useful  comments and to  Shu-
Cheng Llu  for  research  assistance.
1/  Greater  detall  on  the  credit  market  In rural  China and  In the  study  area  Is provided  in
Feder  et  al.  1989,  1990a.
2/  Land Is on  a  fifteen-year  lease  and until  recently  use  rights  could  not  be  transferred.
3/  A rigorous  derivation  of  model Implications  is provided  In an  annex.
4/  The number of  dependents  plus  number of  adults  constitute  household  size.  While the
number of  adults  has an unambiguous effect,  household size (and consequently  the  number
of  dependents)  does  not.
5/  The households  with special  large scale  ceremonial expenditures  were  not  included  in  the
econometric  analysis,  as their  liquidity  requirements  and borrowing  patterns  could  be  quite
differAnt.  This reduces  the  sample size  for  the  econometric  analysis  to  156.  However,
including  these  households,  with  appropriate  dummy variables  and  interaction  terms,  does
not  alter  the  nature  of  the  results  qualitatively.
6/  This  consists  of  cash  value  of  product  inventory,  deposits  in  financial  institutions,  and
fungible  formal  loans.  Informal credit  was assumed non-fungible  as  observed  in  Section
11. Total  liquidity  differs  from  the  total  initial  liquid assets  in  the  orobit  equation,  which
do  not  Include current  fungible  credit.
7/  The equatlons  should have Included output  and Input  prices.  However, because  the  data
are  derived  from  a  cross-section  within a  confined  geographical  area,  there  is  no  price
variation  and  price  variables  are  omitted.ANNEX -16  - --
A MOQEL °F HOUSEHOLD  CONSUMPTION  AND INVESTMENT
Suppose  tc',  household  considers  the  allocation  of resources  at its
disposal  at the  beginning  of the  production  period  between the following
uses:  (i)  cdirrent  consumption  (ii)  investment  (iii)  the  purch.ase  of
variable  inputs. Variable  inputs,  in  combination  with land and  existing
capital,  will produce  next  period's  output. Investment  will not  mature  by
the  time  next period's  output  is  produced,  but its  contribution  to the
household's  welfare  is  accounted  for through  a  valuation  function  which
summarizes  the  contribution  of capital  to the  optimal  consumption  stream.
The household's  initial  endowments  of liquid  resources,  family  labor,
capital,  and land (the  latter  two  assumed  not  convertible  to liquidicy)  can
be augmented  by borrowing  at the  beginning  of the  period. Whether the
household  can  borrow  the  desired  amourit  or is  constrained  by a binding  upper
limit on the availability of credit is of great consequence, as it
determines  whether  production  decisions  are separable  from the  consumption
decisions.  Below we describe the various components of the model, and chen
set up the optimization problem.
a.  Initial endowments
The household possesses initial liquid wealth  (W.),  physical capital
(K,),  land  (A)  and household labor  (X 0).  Household labor can be
approximated by the number of adults.
b.  Production
Output is produced through a standard neo-classical production  function
which combines initial capital, labor and land.- 17  -
(1)  Q  - F(K,,X,A)
Partial  derivatives  are  denoted  by a letter  subscript
dF
(e.  g.  ,  - * Fl)
ax
c.  The  utility  function
The  utility  function  is  defined  over  consumption  per family  member  in
the  present  period,  plus the  utility  of future  streams  of consumption
summarized  by the  valuation  function  of next  period's  capital,  per familv
member. The notation  is
(2)  U - Uo(CO/N) +  UI(C1/N) +  V(K)/N
where  CO  and  C 1 are respectively  total  consumption  in the  present  period
and in the  next  period, K1  is capital  in the  next period, N  is familv
size,  UO  and  U,  are  current  and  next  period  utilities  of consumption
and  V  is the  capital  valuation  function. The cime  discount  factor  is
omitted  from  the  notation  as it is  implicit  in the  definition  of  U.  and
V.  The  marginal  utility  of consumption  and  of capital  value is assumed
decreasing,  i.e., U" <  0,  V" < 0.
d.  Second  period  consumption  and  capital
The capital  stock  in the  next  period  is simply  the  present  stock  K:
augmented  by present  investmene I,  i.e.,- 18  -
(3) If.  V  + I
Consuasion  in  neriod  1 is  given  by the  value  of output  minus  debt
repayment,  i.e.,
(4)  Cl  - F(K ,X,A)  - (l+r).L
where  r  is the interest  rate  and  L  is the  amount  of credit  used.  The
price  of output  is  normalized  to 1, without  loss  of generality.
a.  The  budget  constraint
The total  amount  of liquid  resources  (i.e.  ,  initial  liquid  wealth,  plus
borrowing)  have to equal  the  cash  expenditures  on current  consumption,  labor
costs  for  hired  labor,  and  investment,  i.e.,
(5)  Wo +  L - CO  +  a  (X-XO)  +  I
where  9  is the  wage rate.
The optimization  problem  is
(6)  Max  UO(CO/N)  +  U1(C 1/N) +  V(K 1)/N
CO,Cl,Kl,I,L,X
subject  to equations  (1), (3),  (4),  (5)
By proper  substitutions,  the  optimization  problem  can  be
simplified  to- 19  -
(7)  Max  Uo((Wo  +  L  I  X  +  O.Xo)/N]  +  U1 ([F(K0,X,A)  - (1+r)*L]/N)
I,X,L
+ V(KC  +  I)/N
Consider  first  the  case where  there  is  no binding  constraint  on the
amount  which  the  household  borrows.
Credit  not  a binding  constraint
The first  order  conditions  for  opti-mi  under  this  scenario  are (assume
internal  solutions)
(8)  (-U; + V')/N - 0
(9)  (-6*U0  +  UO.F,)/N  - 0
(10) (U;  - (l+r).Uj],  - 0
Substituting  for  UO  in equation  (9)  using  equation  (10)  and
rearranging  yields
(11) Fx - 9'(l+r)
The  optimal  amount  of labor  (labor  demand),  say  X^,  can  be derived
from  equation  (11)  as  a function  of  0, r,  Ko  and  A
(12)  X  - X' (9,  r, KOO A)
Note that  total  labor  demand  does  not  depend  on any of the  parameters
of the  util.ty  functions,  neither  does it depend  on family  size,  the  number- 20 -
of adults  or initial  liquidity. This is the  well known  separation  property
of household  production  and consumption  models  as devaloped  in Singh  et al.
(1986). Using equation  (12),  the  supply  function  of output  (when  credit  is
not a  bindifrg  constraint)  can  be written  as
(13)  Q  - Q  (9,  r,  K.,  A)
Note that the  econometric  estimation  of equations  (12)  and (13)  should
not include  the  amount  of credit  as an explanatory  variable,  because it is
endogenously  determined.
We turn  now to discuss  the  case  where  the  household  cannot  obtain  as
much  credit  as is  needed  to satisfy  the  first  order  conditions  (8) - (10).
One  characteristic  of such  a situation  is that  equality  (11)  cannot  hold,
and  instead
(14) Fx > 9 (1+r)
Credit  a binding  constraint
The derivation  of first  order  conditions  for this  scenario  is  based  on
the  same  objective  function  (7),  except  that  L  (the  amount  of credit)  is
treated  as a parameter  (it  is  determined  by the  supplier  of credit  and  not
by the  household). The  control  variables  are therefore  only  I  and  X.
The first  order  conditions  are:
(15) (-U0 t  V')/N - 0
(16) (-9*Uo  +  Ui-F.)/N - 0- 21 -
The Hessian  of equations  (15)  - (16)  is
U;  U/N  +  V  - N  8  U" /N21
H - [
L  9U'/Na  (02U;  + U; Fz,  D+  Ul F.,)/Na 
The  determinant  of  H  is
(17)  a  - (8-U`-V"/N 3) +  [(U"/N)  +  V"].(U`  F2+U,.F,,)/N 3 >  0
The sign  of (17)  is established  given  the  concavity  of  UO,  Ul  V  and
F.
The derivation  of comparative  statics  results  is discussed  below.  A
general  observation,  however,  is that  the  input  demand  function  (and
consequently  the  output  supply  function)  depends  on parameters  of the
utility  functions  and  on household  size  the  household's  labor  endowmene  and
liquidity  (including  the  exogenously  determined  amount  of credit).
A differentiation  of equations  (15),  (16)  yields  the following
comparative  static  results,  summarized  in  Table  1 (a fuller  treatmenc  .s
provided  in the  appendix).
An increase  in the  availability  of credit  will increase  investment,
variable  input  use, and  output  of credit-constrained  households,  because  i-
allows  both increased  consumption  and  production. The  analysis  can
demonstrate  that  an additional  unit  of credit  will typically  not  be fullv
used for  productive  purposes  (i.e.  investment  or inputs),  but racher,  a
portion  will be used for increased  current  consumption  (the  so called- 22 -
"leakage problem),  due  to  the  funSibility  of  credit
Table  6; Comoarative  Statig  Results  for  Credit-ConstrainedHou2ehold2
Inveatment  Variable  Output
Input





Credit  (L)  +  +  +
Household  size (N)  - ?
Household  labor  (X.)  +  +  +
Initial  capital  (K 0)  7  ?  +
Land (A)  ?  ?  +
An increase  in the  household  size  while  holding  the  household  labor
force  constant  (i.e.,  an increase  in the  number  of dependents)  will  have a
negative  impact  on investment,  while the  impact  on current  input  use and
output  is  undetermined.  This is  because  the  marginal  utility  of both
present  and  next  period  consumption  is increased,  while  the  marginal
valuation  of capital  is  unchanged. This result  would  not obtain  if the
capital  valuation  function  were  defined  in terms  of capical  per  household
member.
An increase  in the  household's  labor  force  while  holding  household  size
constant  will lead to  an increase  in investment,  variable  input  use  and
output. The reason  is that  under  a  binding  liquidity  constraint,  an
increase  in the  number  of employees  who do not need to  be paid in cash  has- 3  -
an affect  similar  co that  of increased  credit  supply.
Changes  in the  complementary  inputs  (capital  and land)  will increase
output,  as one  would  expect  intuitively. However,  the impact  on input  use
and investment  depends  on the  substitutability  of inputs  and  on the  nature
of the  utility  function.A-PPENDIX
Derivation  of ComDarative  Static  Results
The results  below  are  derived  for  the  case  of  a  household  with a
binding  credit  constraint. We rewrite  the  first  order  conditions  (15),
(16),  omitting  unnecessary  terms
(IA)  -UO  +  V' - 0
(2A)  -9  U' +  U; F. - C
and the  corresponding  Hessian
;uo  +  N  V"  9  uo1
(3A)  H -
O-  d  U  d .U'  + U`-F2  U,  -F.
The  determinant  of  H  is  given  by  6.
I  - 92 .N  V  U  +  (UO  +  N V")(UJ  F+ILU>  F 1 )
Results  of a change  in  each  parameter  of the  system  (IA),  (2A)  are
obtained  by differentiacion  and  a solution  using  Cramer's  rule.
(i)  Change  in  credit  availability  (L)
dI  ulo dl]  0
(4A)  [H]  dX  _
dL  OUO  + Uj.Fx.(l+r)- 25 -
dI  U.U;(F 1x + F, 2.Fx  - 9.(l+r)])
(5A)  - - > 0
dL  A
The  sign is  established  using  the  concavity  of  U  and  F,  and the
fact  that in the  case of a  binding  credit  constraint  it  must  hold  F. >
9.(l+r) (see  (14)  in the text).
dX  N.U".V"  +  (UO  +  N.V").UL>F  .(l+r)
(6A) - - >  0
dL  A
where  the  sign is  established  by the  concavity  of  U  and  V.  The
8Q
sign of  - follows trivially, as
8L
aQ  F,.dx
(7A)  - - - >  0
aL  dL
(ii) Change  in  household  size  N
dl  - UO CO
dN
(8A)  N2 [H]  dX 
dS J  -Uo  -Co  + Ul Cl F 1
1  dI  -UO  -CO  *(U;  F2+U,  F-.) -9.U"  4U *C,  -F,
(9A) - --  < 
N2 dN  A- ,6  -
1  dX  U" U; C 1 F 1 +  NV". (U;  C 1 F,  O U.C'o)
(IOA)  - - .
N2 dN
dX
The sign  of  - cannot  be established  because  the  term
aN
U"C 1Fx-9  U  C 0 can  be positive  or negative. Consequently,  the  impact
on output  is  also undetermined.
(iii) Change  in  household  labor  (XO)
dl ~  dl  (UF 2 +  U'  Fo
(1LA)  -H  - L  R 
d.X 0
dX  e2.N.V".U 0
(13A)  H  >0X
dXo  A
(iv)  Change  in initial  capital Ko
(14A)  [H]  [  t:  ]  _  [
Tyial  l  pt  e  L  a  in te  s  e  - 0,  ad 
Typichangely  initisar  compitlentr  intesnsKx  O  n  h- 27  -
dI  dX
signs of  -,  - cannot be determined because the sign of  -U; F.k
dKo  dK
dQ  dX
U*  F, R  .s not  known.  However,  - - F,  -+  Fk  and it can be
dKo  dKo
shown  that
dQ  -(1J  +  NVO).(Ui.Fz.FIk  - U; F,,Fk) +  9.N.UO.V"(Fk  +  F1)
(15A)  - - ->0
dKo
(v)  Changes  in land  endowment  (A)
(16A)  (H]  - [  F  U . F
dA JUL  u;FX. u;  UFX F  &
dI  dX
As in the case of  K0,  the sign of  - and  - cannot be determined
dA  dA
because the sign of  -U' F1. - Ul F 1 F.  is not known.  However
dQ  dX  NF. .UI  V"  (U 1 +  N.V")(U,F,.F,,  -U,F  F,F)
(17A)  - - Fx - +  F  - >
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